Abstract: Production sharing contracts have been used in the development of China's offshore petroleum resources since 1982, but the mechanism in which the fi scal terms impact project economics is complicated and not well understood. The purpose of this paper is to model China's offshore production sharing contracts using a probabilistic approach. Cash fl ows and economic indicators are used for a typical offshore oilfi eld development, and meta-models are constructed to analyze the basic features of the fi scal system. Applications of the models in contract negotiation are discussed.
Introduction
Production sharing contracts (PSCs) are among the most common types of contractual arrangements for petroleum exploration and development (Ge et al, 2004) . Under a PSC, the state as the owner of mineral resources engages a international oil company (IOC) as a contractor to provide technical and financial services for exploration and development operations. The resource-owner state is traditionally represented by the government or one of its agencies such as the national oil company (NOC). The IOC acquires an entitlement to a stipulated share of the oil produced as a reward for the risk taken and services rendered. The state, however, remains the owner of the petroleum produced subject only to the contractor's entitlement to its share of production. The government or its NOC usually has the option to participate in different aspects of the exploration and development process. PSCs also frequently provide for the establishment of a joint committee, where both parties are represented, and which monitors the operations (Bindemann, 1999) .
The China Offshore Standard PSC (hereinafter referred to as China PSC) has been used in China's offshore petroleum development in cooperation with foreign oil companies since 1982. Similar to other PSCs, the basic fiscal elements in the China PSC include royalty, cost recovery, government participation, profi t sharing, and taxation (Wang, 1999) . Many aspects of the government/contractor relationship may be negotiated but some are normally determined by legislation (Johnston, 1994) . Tax rates are almost always legislated and can be adjusted or revised by the government, impacting the economics of a project. Therefore, it is necessary and important for both the IOC and government to understand the manner in which the fiscal terms impact the economic measures of a project.
Sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis are common methods for uncertainty analysis. Sensitivity analysis is usually used to examine the impact on project economics when only one variable changes (Xu et al, 1999; Blank and Targuin, 2005) ; scenario analysis is used to compare systems for similar sets of conditions (Black and Roberts, 2006; CERA, 2007) . However, these methods can not indicate the functional relationships that exist between economic indicators and the collection of fiscal terms. Kaiser (Kaiser and Pulsipher, 2005; Kaiser, 2007) introduced the metamodeling approach in analyzing petroleum fiscal systems, whereby meta data is generated for variables simulated within a given design space and a meta-model constructed from the meta data. The meta-modeling concept has been used elsewhere, e.g., in software engineering (Liu et al, 2008) . The meta-modeling approach in fiscal analysis is useful to understand the structure and sensitivity of fiscal systems to various model parameters.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the manner in which fiscal terms impact project economics under the China PSC. After introducing the terms of the China PSC and background information on cash flows and economic indicators, the development scenario for an offshore oil fi eld is presented and a meta model for economic indicators is developed. Based on these models, the basic features of the China PSC fi scal system are analyzed and its applications are discussed.
China offshore PSC fi scal system
Under China PSCs that involve exploration activities, the IOC must complete a minimum amount of work (minimum work commitment) and bear all the costs during the exploration period. After a commercial discovery is made, these costs can be recovered with production.
In general, the Chinese government or its NOC has the option to take up to 51% participating interests in the development and production of any discovery and may exercise such option after the IOC has independently undertaken all the exploration risks and costs, completed all the exploration work and viable commercial discoveries have been made. Once the NOC participates in development, the development and operating costs are funded by the NOC and IOC according to their respective percentage of the participating interests. The production allocation under China PSCs is shown in Fig. 1 and summarized as follows. Value-added tax A value-added tax of 5% of annual gross production is paid to the government.
Royalty The royalty rate varies on a sliding scale from 0% to 12.5% for crude oil and 0% to 3% for natural gas (Table 1) . The fi rst tranche of production that triggers royalty payments is 1 million tons for crude oil and 200 million standard cubic meters for natural gas.
Cost recovery limit The cost recovery limit is not given directly under China PSCs, instead, the total amount of the royalty payment and the cost recovery is limited to 62.5% 350-500 million standard cubic meters 2%
Above 500 million standard cubic meters 3% Table 1 Royalty rates for oil and gas of annual gross production. If the annual oil production is less than 1 million tons, then there is no royalty payment and the entire 62.5% of annual production can be used for cost recovery. When the oil production exceeds 1 million tons per year, the percentage of the production used for cost recovery is equal to 62.5% less the royalty rate. In practice, the cost recovery limit for oil varies from 50% to 62.5% of the annual gross production. The sequence, in which costs are recovered, is specifi ed by the contract terms, but typically includes (inorder) operating costs, exploration costs, and development costs and deemed interest. Any excess from cost recovery limit over recovered costs is allocated to the remainder oil (gas). The China PSC allows uplift for development costs with interest, where the interest rate is preset in the contract. Profi t oil 32.5% of the annual gross production and any excess from cost recovery is distributed to the government and oil companies according to the split ratio "X". An amount of oil and gas equal to the product of the profi t oil multiplied by (1-X) is first distributed to the government as share oil. The balance of the profit oil is then distributed to the NOC and IOC based on each party's participating interest. The split ratio "X" is a sliding scale based on the gross production. An example of the split ratio "X" is shown in Table 2 .
Additional taxes The NOC and IOC also pay the special oil gain levy (SOG levy) and income taxes. In 2006, a special oil gain levy ("SOG levy") was set by the Ministry of Finance of China at rates from 20% to 40% on the portion of the monthly weighted average sales price of the crude oil lifted in China exceeding US$40 per barrel (Table 3 ). The SOG levy paid can be claimed as a deductible expense for corporate income tax purposes and is calculated based on the actual volume of the crude oil entitled. For tax purposes, the exploration costs are expensed and the development costs 
Analysis of fi scal system
The meta-models indicate some general features of the China PSC fi scal system. The royalty mechanism did not play a signifi cant role because of the high production requirement for the first tranche, and would not be a relevant parameter in negotiation. The government participating interest and split ratio are signifi cant factors, but the cost recovery limit and deemed interest rate have relatively minor impact. This indicates that the government participating interest and split ratio are more signifi cant parameters than the selection of the cost recovery limit and deemed interest rate. It seems that the high cost recovery limit and uplift of development costs with interest have not provided significant incentives to foreign investors as expected. Thus, if necessary, the IOC may make some concession in negotiation on the cost recovery limit and deemed interest rate, while they should try to have the government participating interest as low as possible and the split ratio as high as possible.
On the other hand, the value-added tax rate, income tax rate, and SOG levy rate are usually not negotiable. Nevertheless, oil companies should recognize the impact caused by the potential changes in these variables. Changing the value-added tax rate has the largest impact on the IOC's economic indicators. This result is not unexpected, because only the value-added tax is levied based on gross production or gross revenue. In addition, high oil price would lead to low IOC's Take, which is probably caused by the SOG levy. Fig.  2 shows that with no SOG levy, the IOC's Take increase with oil price and reaches a relatively stable level. However, if the SOG levy is considered, the IOC's Take would decline after the oil price exceeds $40/bbl. IOCs thus need to carefully consider the potential impact of the SOG level on the economic viability of the project.
Application
The sensitivity of the economic indicators to various fi scal terms is readily understood. The IOC's NPV will increase $0.0353 million, $0.0947 million, and $0.891 million if the cost recovery limit, deemed interest rate and split ratio rises 1%, respectively; and it will decrease $1.443 million, $1.299 million, $1.088 million and $0.404 million when the valueadded tax rate, government participating interest, income tax rate and SOG rate increases 1%, respectively. In the same way, we can learn about how much the IRR or Take will change when one or more variables change.
Using the meta-models, the IOC can directly evaluate and compare various fi scal term combinations in the process of negotiation and select an appropriate strategy by tradeoffs between risk and reward. For example, for (P, VAT, DIR, TAX, SOG) = (50, 5%, 9%, 25%, 20%), approach is used to develop generalized functional relations (meta-models) of the NPV, IRR and Take in terms of fiscal parameters. The models illustrate that the government participating interest and split ratio are more significant parameters than the cost recovery limit and deemed interest rate. In addition, the sizes of most fields are smaller than 1 million tons of the production threshold for royalty payment, so the royalty is not a key parameter in China PSC negotiation. The IOC should pay close attention to change in the value-added tax rate because of its signifi cant impact on economic indicators. We also showed that high oil prices will lead to low IOC Take and the SOG levy may reduce the attractiveness of the China PSC.
GPI
The meta-models describe the linear relationship between the economic indicators and fiscal variables and can be conveniently used in PSC negotiation. The meta-models show clearly the sensitivity of the economic indicators to the changes of fi scal terms and provide a valuation for parameter changes. With the meta-models, both IOC and NOC can evaluate and compare combination strategies.
